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I. INTRODUCTION
To preserve the freedom of the human mind and freedom of the press,
every spirit should be ready to devote itself to martyrdom; for as long as
we may think as we will, and speak as we think, the condition of man will
proceed in improvement.1
On June 22, 2000, the Third Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction2 ruling that
the Child Online Protection Act (C.O.P.A.), 42 U.S.C. § 231, designed to protect

1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Green Mumford (June 18, 1799), The Letters of
Thomas Jefferson: 1793-1826, at http://educ.let.zng.n\/~usa/P/tj3/writings/bzf/jefl127.htm
(last visited Sept. 16, 2000).
2

ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).
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juveniles using the World Wide Web from “harmful material”3 measured by
“contemporary community standards,” violated the First Amendment and thus, was
unconstitutional. The federal court’s criticism of the “community standard” test for
determining obscenity came very close to declaring that the test was unworkable
with respect to the internet and determined that as far as obscenity was concerned,
the internet deserved special consideration apart from other media such as books,
videos, and broadcast.
This note concurs with the decision reached by the Third Circuit. The federal
obscenity law, which incorporated the contemporary community standards test is
unconstitutional as applied to expression on the internet because it has chilling effect
on the exercise of freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Such unconstitutionality is demonstrated in
situations where people exercising their right to free speech potentially face
prosecution under federal obscenity laws where the obscenity test is likely to be
based on the community standards of the most stringent contemporary views.4
Incoherent guidelines and differing community standards create a chilling effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights because creators of websites risk
prosecution in communities that have the most stringent views on obscenity. For
example, what happens if a resident of California creates a website displaying
sexually explicit materials which conform to the community standards of the
community, in which he or she resides and those materials are downloaded by a
viewer in Oklahoma? In this situation, even though the host of the website did not
intentionally solicit the download in this particular geographical region, the owner of
the website may be prosecuted under the federal law and likely convicted if the
materials posted on the web are found obscene by the assumingly less liberal
community standards of Oklahoma.
At the present time, there is no technology that would allow a website operator to
limit the locales in which the sexually explicit material might appear. Therefore, in
order to avoid prosecution, a person intending to express himself by publishing
sexual materials on the internet must ensure that such materials comply with the
most stringent contemporary standards in the country. Web publishers do not have
another alternative, because there is no guarantee that somebody from that
community will not access the website and by virtue of this possibly subject the
owner of the materials to criminal prosecution. As a result, freedom of speech is
unreasonably and unconstitutionally restrained.
Because freedom of speech would be restrained by any incorporation of
community standards in federal regulation of the internet, the legislature should
refrain from adopting a standard that would apply in all internet situations. Rather,
with respect to obscenity, the internet should be left to self-regulation.
3
“Harmful material” is defined by Child Online Protection Act as any “communication . . .
that is obscene or that—the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to,
or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;depicts, describes, or respects, in a manner
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact,
an actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; andtaken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political, or
scientific value to minors.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000).
4

See United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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In reaching this conclusion, Part II provides a brief historical timeline in the
development of obscenity law. Part IV of this comment examines the nature of the
ever-changing medium of the internet and governmental actions directed at
regulating speech expressed through this medium. After that, Part V of the article
looks into the soundness of the contemporary community standards aspect of the
current obscenity test as it applied to the internet, and also examines alternatives to
the test. Finally, the comment concludes that the Miller v. California test for
obscenity is not workable as applied to the internet and for lack of another
constitutionally protective test, this medium should be left free from federal
regulation.
II. OBSCENITY LAW AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Courts and juries have always been puzzled when facing the task of determining
what constitutes obscenity. The long process of developing a workable test is still
far from the finish line and there is little hope that it will ever be reached. In 1868,
the first attempt to establish an obscenity test was authored by Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn in Regina v. Hicklin.5 In Hicklin, the matter in controversy was a
pamphlet describing the immoral character of Catholic priests.6 The test for
obscenity proposed by the Chief Justice was “whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”7 For a
number of years, the Hincklin test was recognized as the primary standard for
obscenity in the United States as well. The test, however, underwent wide criticism,8
which eventually led to the adoption of a different test in Roth v. United States.9
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the United States government
from limiting the expression of speech.10 Obscene material is, however, not entitled
to constitutional protection under the First Amendment. In Roth, the Court stated
that the First Amendment was not meant to protect obscene speech since obscene
matter had no social value.11 The new test for obscenity espoused by the Roth

5

3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (Eng. 1868).

6

Id. at 362.

7

Id. at 371.

8

In United States v. Kennerly, 209 F. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), Judge Learned Hand
considered the test as unduly harsh. See also United States v. One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
9

354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957) (upholding a federal statute that made it a crime to mail
“[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing,
print, or other publication of an indecent character”).
10

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
11

The Court concluded that:
[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First
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decision was “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeal[ed] to prurient
interest.”12 It was in Roth that the Court first defined a “prurient interest” as a
“shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, where the material goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters.”13 Once again, the Court’s attempt at creating an obscenity test was far
from being clear—it was neither possible to ascertain who was an “average person,”
or what “contemporary community standards” entailed.
Half a decade later, in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,14 the patent offensiveness
aspect of the modern test for obscenity began to form. In this case, the Supreme
Court had to decide whether magazines, which appealed to prurient interests but
were not patently offensive could be deemed obscene. The Court held that the
magazines were not obscene because they could not be deemed “so offensive on
their face as to affront current community standards of decency,” thereby,
establishing the patent offensiveness test which has survived to the present day as
part of the modern test for obscenity.15
The next struggling effort by the Supreme Court to determine whether obscene
speech could be meaningfully defined or punished criminally was in Jacobellis v.
Ohio.16 In Jacobellis, the Court, although reaffirming the test in Roth, held that
judgment as to whether a particular work was obscene should be made on the basis
of a national standard.17 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, gave his
interpretation of “contemporary community standards” under the Roth test. In doing
so, he pointed out that a standard representing views of a particular local community,
in which a certain matter is deemed obscene, would inevitably deny access to such
material in communities where it is considered acceptable.18
A different test was outlined in A Book Named “John Clelands’ Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General of Massachusetts.19 Setting forth the new
standard, the Court stated:
as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce: it must
be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently
offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance…
354 U.S. at 484.
12

Id. at 489.

13

Id. at 488 (equating the case law meaning of prurient interest with the definition of
Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957)).
14

370 U.S. 478 (1962).

15

Id. at 482.

16

378 U.S. 184 (1964); see id. at 197 (Stewart, J., “I know it when I see it”).

17

Id. at 195 (“It is, after all, a national Constitution we are expounding.”).

18

Id. at 193.

19

383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material
is utterly without redeeming social value.20
Thus, the Supreme Court established a new tripartite test for obscenity. Applying
the newly constructed test, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the
Clelands’ book was obscene.21 The Court reasoned that the book could not be
considered obscene if it possessed some minimal literary, scientific, or artistic
value.22 After the Memoirs test, it became a more difficult task for the prosecution to
prove that a particular matter was obscene. Thus, the scope of obscenity regulation
was limited.23
The current obscenity standard was fleshed out by the Supreme Court in the 1973
decision of Miller v. California.24 In Miller, the Court was called upon to review the
constitutionality of California Penal Code section 311.2(a).25 Pursuant to the
California statute, distribution of matters considered obscene constituted a
misdemeanor. Miller, the defendant, was convicted under this statute for making
unsolicited mass mailings of “adult” material depicting men and women engaging in
a variety of sexual activities.26 In order to determine whether the material was
obscene the Court constructed the following test:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.27
III. MODERN TEST FOR OBSCENITY
The new three-prong test for obscenity formulated by the Court in Miller v.
California was based primarily on the Roth test.28 As the first prong of the new
20

Id. at 418.

21

Id. at 419.

22

Id.

23

FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 43 (1973).

24

413 U.S. 15 (1973).

25

Id. at 16.

26

Id. at 18.

27

Id. at 24.

28

The primary federal statute incorporating Miller test for obscenity is title 18, section
1462 of the United States Code. Under this statute, the following materials were found to be
obscene: a magazine named The Name is Bonnie, a forty-eight page publication containing
forty-five pages of nude photographs of same female model, emphasizing model’s sex organs,
see Miller v. United States, 507 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1974); films depicting adult men and
women participating in various sex acts including sexual intercourse with penetration, fellatio,
cunnilingus, and masturbation, such acts being committed heterosexually and homosexually
between couples and in groups, and which on several occasions showed semen ejaculated and
then spread on women’s bodies, see United States v. American Theater Corp., 526 F.2d 48
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definition of obscenity, the Court retained the prurient interest test articulated in
Roth. Thus, material would be obscene if an “average person,” would find that the
material appeals to the prurient interest.29 The contemporary community standard
first established in Roth was reconsidered and modified in Miller. In Miller, the
Court discarded the national standards part of the Roth test by giving this provision a
more literal meaning.30 Under the holding in Miller, the fact finder has to apply
contemporary community standards rather than national ones when determining
whether material appeals to the prurient interest.31 In the opinion of the Court, it was
“neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found
tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City.”32 Moreover, the Court stated that the
application of a national community standard would be an endeavor in futility.33
(8th Cir. 1975), film Pornography: Copenhagen 1970, and trailers The Trucker’s Girl, Tender
is the Flesh, Penetrator, Midnight Cowgirl, revealing almost every form of sexual intercourse,
both natural and unnatural, in various positions, see United States v. Strand Art Theatre Corp.,
325 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Mont. 1970), pictures portraying ultimate sexual act, both normal and
perverted, consisting of representations of masturbation, genital exhibition, and various forms
of sexual fetishes, see United States v. Kelly, 398 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Mont. 1975), rev’d on
other grounds, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976), and books comprising short stories explicitly
describing various homosexual activities, including fellatio and sodomy, between men and
boys and photographs showing completely nude boys with their genitals exposed, see United
States v. Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1971).
In contrast, the following sexually explicit materials were determined to be not obscene or
immoral within the Miller test: a scientific book written with seriousness and decency, and
giving information to the medical profession regarding the operation of birth control clinics,
including patron instructions necessary to be given out at such clinics, see United States v.
One Book Entitled “Contraception,” 51 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1931), and a publication of
informative and instructive character, explaining to married people how their mutual sexual
life might be improved, see United States v. One Book Entitled “Married Love,” 48 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1931).
29
In Roth, the Court defined the prurient appeal of the material as “material having a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts.” Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. It should also be noted that the
Court stated that “under the holding announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution
for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written
or construed.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
30

See id. at 32.

31

In articulating that community standards did not mean the standards of the nation as a
whole, the Court referred to the comment of Chief Justice Warren in his dissent in Jacobellis
v. Ohio:
It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined by
reference to ‘community standards,’ it meant community standards—not a national
standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable ‘national
standard.’ … At all events the Court has not been able to enunciate one, and it would
be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine one.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
32
Id. Many scholars brought into question whether the Miller “community standards” test
has a constitutional source. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 4 TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.60 (3rd ed. 1999); see also Gregory
J. Battersby, Obscene and Indecent Materials, in GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA,
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The second part of the obscenity test enunciated in Miller is whether the work
depicts or describes in a “patently offensive” way sexual conduct that is prohibited
by the applicable state law.34 This prong of the test poses a requirement that the state
obscenity statutes be specific in defining sexual depictions that are considered
obscene.35 The patent offensiveness part of the test must be determined applying
community standards.36
The third prong of the Miller, namely: “whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” [hereinafter “SLAPS
test”] replaced the “utterly without redeeming social value” test in Roth.37 It should
be noted that in contrast to the first two parts of the Miller test, it was held that the
SLAPS test38 is to be applied using a reasonable person standard.39 In this respect,
when determining the value of the work, contemporary community standards have
LAW OF THE INTERNET § 8.01, 8-9 (Aspen Law & Business 2001-1 Supp.) (questioning the
discord between the community standards enunciated by the Court and the national nature of
the First Amendment’s scope). According to the Court, even though the fundamental limiting
principles of the First Amendment on the states’ power are no different from one community
to another, the diversity of tastes and attitudes of people in different states should not “be
strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
33

Id. at 30.

34

See id. at 24.

35

The Court provided several “plain examples of what a state statute could define for
regulation under part (b) of the standard announced in this opinion . . . .” See id. at 25. “The
examples of such conduct included: (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of
the genitals.” Id. It should also be noted that the Court stated that “under the holdings today,
no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these
materials depict or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined
by the regulating state law, as written or construed.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
36

Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977) (stating that out of the three prongs of
the Miller test only the first two—prurient appeal and patent offensiveness—are determined
by applying contemporary community standards. Accordingly, the first two parts of the test
are to be determined by local juries and the third prong is to be decided by the judge).
37

See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, at 722 (noting that the replacement of the
Memoirs “utterly” standard to “serious” empowered juries with more discretion under the new
standard). In rejecting the Memoirs standard, the Court reasoned that the standard created a
“burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.” Miller, 413
U.S. at 22.
38
“SLAPS test” is the name by which attorneys refer to the “serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value” test.
39

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). “[T]he Court’s opinion stands for the clear
proposition that the First Amendment does not permit a majority to dictate to discrete
segments of the population . . . the value that may be found in various pieces of work. . . .
Reasonable people certainly may differ as to what constitutes literary or artistic merit. . . .
[T]he Court’s opinion today envisions that even a minority view among reasonable people that
a work has value may protect that work from being judged ‘obscene.’” Id. at 506 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
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no application because “literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” of materials is
not deemed to vary from community to community.40
A. Community: What is it?
Although the court defined the obscenity test in Miller, it failed to provide a
specific definition or geographic dimensions of the community standards for a jury
to consider when deciding whether a particular work is obscene. The Supreme Court
attempted to articulate the notion of community in subsequent cases. In Hamling v.
United States,41 the Court interpreted Miller as permitting a state to constitutionally
proscribe obscenity in terms of a statewide standard.42 However, delineation of such
precise geographic area is not required “as a matter of constitutional law.”43 Thus,
the Court reaffirmed its holding in Miller that the proper standards applied in federal
obscenity prosecutions should be those of a community and not of a nation.44
In Jenkins v. Georgia,45 the Court held that the Constitution did not establish a
requirement to instruct juries, in state obscenity cases, to apply the standard of a
hypothetical statewide community.46 Furthermore, the Court approved the trial
court’s actions in instructing a jury to apply community standards without defining
community.47 Affirming the Miller decision, the Court in Jenkins stated that a state
was free to allow juries to rely “on the understanding of the community from which
they came as to contemporary community standards,” and that the state had full

40

Id. at 501.

41

418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Hamling, William Hamling was convicted of mailing and
conspiring to mail an obscene brochure with sexually explicit photographs in violation of
federal law. Id. At trial, the jury was instructed to judge obscenity according to “what is
reasonably accepted according to the contemporary standards of the community as a
whole. . . . Contemporary community standards means the standards generally held
throughout this country concerning sex and matters pertaining to sex. This phrase means, as it
has been aptly stated, the average conscience of the time, and the present critical point in the
compromise between candor and shame, at which the community may have arrived here and
now.” Id. at 103. On appeal, the Court, acknowledging that such an instruction delineated a
wider geographic area than warranted by Miller, held that the jury instruction referring to the
standard of the “nation as a whole” nevertheless accomplished the principal purpose of the
requirement that a judgment be made on the basis of “contemporary community standards,”
which is “the material is judged neither on the basis of each juror’s personal opinion, nor by its
effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive person or group.” Id. at 107.
42

Id. at 105.

43

Hamling, 418 U.S. at 105.

44

Id. at 104.

45

418 U.S. 153 (1974) (In Jenkins, the Supreme Court had to decide the validity of
conviction of a theater manager who violated a Georgia obscenity statute for playing the
motion picture Carnal Knowledge.).
46

Id. at 157.

47

Id.
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discretion to provide a statutory definition of a community.48 Many states have acted
on this proposition and established a statutory definition of a community.49
Three years later, in Smith v. United States,50 the Supreme Court determined that
although states were permitted to impose a geographic limit on community
standards, no state legislature may proscribe what those standards should be.51
According to the Court, juries are entitled to rely on their own knowledge of
community standards and consider the “entire community and not simply their own
subjective reactions, or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous minority.”52
Nevertheless, all definitions of obscenity, make little sense because “this type of
judgment is inevitably subjective and personal. Court and juries continue to differ
over what constitutes obscenity, often including in that category materials that have

48
Id. The court also noted that an obscenity offense in terms of contemporary community
standards could be defined by states similarly to the definition in Miller, or in more precise
geographic terms. Id. Many states have acted on this proposition and have established
statutory definitions of a community. A states’ definition of community vary greatly with
other states, examples include communities equated with the size of (a) state, (b) county,
locality, or vicinage, and (c) the area from which the jury is drawn. For a comprehensive list
of jurisdictions, which have statutorily defined community see Richard N. Coglianese, Sex,
Bytes, and Community Entrapment: The Need for a New Obscenity Standard for the TwentyFirst Century, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 385, 406 n.162-64, 166 (1995).
49
The states’ definitions of community vary greatly and examples include communities
equated with the size of (a) state, (b) county, locality, or vicinage, and (c) the area from which
the jury is drawn. Military courts have gone beyond the idea of a geographic community and
apply a military community standard. See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (A.F. Crim.
App. 1995); United States v. Dyer, 22 M.J. 578 (A.C.M.R. 1986). For a comprehensive list of
jurisdictions which have statutorily defined the community see Coglianese, supra note 48, at
406 nn.162-64, 166. For a compilation of jurisdictions determining the dimensions of a
community through judicial process see Patrick T. Egan, Virtual Community Standards:
Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Community Standard of Cyberspace?, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117, 144 n.204-05 (1996).
50

431 U.S. 291 (1977).

51

Id. at 303. In United States v. Danley, 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975), the court held that
lack of state prohibition on dissemination of obscene materials in Oregon did not establish
community standards for that state; violation was of a federal statute which was neither
dependant nor incorporated state laws. The court reasoned that the fact that certain conduct is
permitted by the state did not necessarily mean that that people within the state approve of
such conduct. The court also approved the trial court’s consideration of community as
embracing more than the state of Oregon.
52
Smith, 431 U.S. at 305. One commentator expressed concern regarding the jury’s
discretion as to the determination of what community standards are, by stating that:
If the trier of fact is free to identify and apply community standards unrestrained by
judicial or legislative specification of the relevant community, and without regard to
evidence introduced at trial, the trier of fact’s conclusions … with the weight of the
evidence, and unaware of he specific community whose standards were supposedly
applied, an appellate court is left without benchmarks by which to judge the validity of
a finding of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness.
See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v. California, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1844 (1975).
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won world-wide acclaim.”53 The concept of community standards has been very
controversial since its inception, and it gave birth to a host of problems, especially
with respect to jurisdictional issues.
The issue of what community standards should govern in an obscenity
prosecution is even more problematic when allegedly obscene materials travel
through multiple communities. This critical issue of defining the applicable
community standard with respect to transmission of obscene materials via the
internet was highlighted in United States v. Thomas.54 In this case, operators of the
Amateur Action Computer Bulletin Board System were convicted and sentenced to
prison for transmitting obscene materials over interstate telephone lines.55 The
defendants, who operated their computer bulletin board from California, were
prosecuted in Memphis, Tennessee, when the pornographic materials were
transmitted to a U. S. Postal Inspector, a resident of Tennessee.56
The Court found that the federal statute criminalizing transmission of obscenity
over interstate telephone lines covered transmission of computerized images.57 The
Court rejected the contention that the only information transferred by their system
were intangible strings of binary code, which were arguably beyond the scope of the
statute.58 The Court found that it was “spurious” for the defendants to claim that
they did not intend to sell, disseminate or share obscene files.59 The defendants
argued that the relevant community standards, which should be employed by the
Court, were those of the place where the transmission originated.60 The predominant
view, however, is that the appropriate legal standard to be used is the place where the
obscene materials are received.61

53
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENITY: PORNOGRAPHY AND
INDECENCY, POLICY NO. 4, POLICY GUIDE, at http://www.eff.org/pub/censorship/
obscenity_and_censorship_aclu.article (last visited Sept. 25, 2001).
54

74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).

55

Id. at 705.

56

Id. at 705-06.

57

Id. at 706-07.

58

Id. at 706. When the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the
defendants’ contention was that title 18, section 1465 of the United States Code applied only
to tangible materials and did not apply to intangible images stored and transmitted as computer
files.
59

Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706-07.

60

Id. at 711.

61

See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106 (providing that “[t]he fact that distributors of allegedly
obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute
unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national standards of
obscenity”); see also United States v. Cohen, 583 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that in a
prosecution for distribution of obscene material, the applicable community standards were
those of the district where materials were shipped to and delivered, and in which the federal
government prosecuted the case rather than the standards of the district where the materials
were mailed).
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One of the questions that accompanies any obscenity prosecution is which
community’s standards should be applied in a given case. It has long been
established that it is constitutional to subject interstate distributors of obscenity to
varying community standards.62 It has also been recognized that issues pertaining to
which community’s standards are to be applied in an obscenity prosecution have a
lot in common with issues regarding venue.63 According to 18 U.S.C. § 3237, venue
for federal obscenity prosecutions lies in any district from, through or into which the
allegedly obscene material moves.64 Thus, either the “district of dispatch or the
district of receipt” may serve as a forum for prosecutions, with the community
standards being of the place where the trial takes place.65 Such a state of law allows
the prosecution to forum shop and adds even more confusion into already
complicated community standards issues. Keeping in mind that the prosecution has
a choice of bringing a prosecution either in the district of receipt or the district of
transmittal, if the indictment is originally brought in a district where obscene
materials were mailed or transmitted, standards of that community may still be used
if the case is transferred to the district of delivery.66
The court in United States v. Mohney67 voiced a concern regarding such an
application of community standards. In Mohney, nine defendants were indicted for
using a common carrier for interstate carriage of obscene material in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 1462 (1976).68 The allegedly obscene materials were placed in
interstate commerce in the Eastern District of Michigan and distributed in multiple
districts around the country.69 The case was originally brought in the Eastern District
of Michigan, but eventually was transferred to the District of Hawaii, where the court
had to address the issue of the applicable obscenity standards.70 Attempting to solve
this issue, the court acknowledged that given the prosecution’s ability to choose a
forum between either the place of mailing or the place of address or delivery, under
the then and now current law, “the applicable standards should be those of the
community where the action is brought.”71 Because the charges were brought in the
62
See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106; United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210, 217 (6th Cir.
1979).
63

United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996).

64

Id. (stating that “[t]his may result in prosecutions of persons in a community to which
they have sent materials which is obscene under that community’s standards though the
community from which it is sent would tolerate the same material.”).
65

Id. (citing United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830-31 (11th Cir. 1982)).

66

United States v. Mohney, 476 F. Supp. 421 (D. Haw. 1979).

67

Id.

68

Id. at 423.

69

Id. (the destinations to which the sexually explicit materials were delivered included
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Studio City, California; Atlanta, Georgia; Honolulu, Hawaii;
Denver, Colorado; and Providence, Rhode Island).
70

Id. (District of Hawaii was one of communities in which the allegedly obscene materials
were distributed).
71

Mohney, 476 F. Supp. at 425.
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Eastern District of Michigan, the court would have to instruct the jury from the
District of Hawaii to determine and apply the local community standards of the
Eastern District of Michigan.
While admitting that theoretically such resolution of the matter was possible “so
long as the government ha[d] the right to choose its own forum, and so long as local
community standards [were] the measuring stick,”72 the court opined that since “[i]t
would be senseless to allow the community where the materials were transmitted to
make the obscenity determination, but force that community to use the standards of
the community where the materials were distributed,” it would equally make little
sense to have the jury from the district of receipt of allegedly obscene material to
make the determination of obscenity judging by community standards of the district
of transmission.73 “If jurors cannot draw on personal knowledge, the idea of local
community standards is a totally useless concept.”74
Although issues like the one described above do not come up frequently in
obscenity prosecutions under federal law, they create more of a concern in state
cases. For instance, in an obscenity case tried under state law in a jurisdiction
recognizing “statewide” community standards, the jury is instructed to apply the
standards of the community that is the size of the state. The jury pool in such
prosecution is, however, comprised not of the citizens of the state as a whole but
rather of residents of a judicial district where the court sits, be it a county or other
municipal subdivision of the state. The problem that arises under such circumstances
is that the “statewide community standards” is nothing but fiction because jurors
being pulled from a very small locality would not be able to use their own
considerations on what is considered obscene in the community with which they are
familiar, but rather they would have to guess at what the state standards are. To
prove such “statewide” standards, the prosecution is usually free to put on expert
testimony. At the same time, “[w]hile expert opinions may be relevant, jurors are
completely free to disregard all expert testimony.”75
Application of the community standards concept to the internet has created even
more problems for the courts to deal with. Courts applying the Miller test could not
have possibly anticipated that there would be a new community that would defy
traditional definitions and make application of the Miller test even more of a
challenge than it already had been. If the test is replete with difficulties even when
applied to conventional media, in the era of the internet the community standards
aspect of the test is practically unworkable.
72

Id. at 427.

73

Id. at 425-26. The court also noted that there was no precedent on the issue of whether
the community standards of the district of transmission might be used when the case is
originally brought in that district and then transferred. In the court’s opinion such question
was unlikely to come up because of high likelihood of the transmission district being a large
city with more liberal views than smaller communities in which the material would be
distributed and thus the defendants would be reluctant to transfer the case elsewhere. Id. at
426 n.6.
74

Id. at 427.

75

Mohney, 476 F. Supp. at 426-27 (reasoning that the cornerstone of the decisions in
Miller and Hamling was the idea that jurors should draw on personal knowledge of their own
community).
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IV. INTERNET AND FREE SPEECH
“Internet,” “cyberspace,” and “information superhighway” are some of the many
names people have been calling a relatively new medium known also as world wide
web. This medium originally started out as a creation of the Advanced Research
Projects Agency [hereinafter “ARPA”], an entity under control of the Department of
Defense.76 The ARPAnet—a communications network created by ARPA in 1969 and
intended for use as a safe place to discuss military research—soon lost much of its
secrecy and other networks that were open for access by virtually anyone emerged.77
It is hardly possible to determine the dimensions of the internet.78 This “network
of networks”79 constantly evolves and grows in numbers of its users.80 The world
wide web is comprised of millions of web sites all linked together so that a user is
enabled to travel from one web page to another with the ease of a click of a button.81
In a short period of time, the world wide web82 became a forum for communicating
one’s ideas to “an audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have
imagined.”83 “The internet in general, and the [world wide] web in particular,
represents the most participatory marketplace of mass speech yet developed, it is in
76

The ARPA was established in 1957 as a response by the United States to the launch of
the first artificial earth satellite Sputnik by the USSR. In light of fear by the Pentagon that
new Soviet technology made possible for the nuclear warheads to reach the United States, the
purpose of the agency was to achieve scientific and technological supremacy of the United
States within the military field. The idea was to come up with technology enabling computers
network. In case of a nuclear attack, even if some computers were destroyed, the rest would
continue to function. See Dave Kristula, The History of the Internet, at http://www.dave
site.com/webstation/net-history.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2001). See also Maureen A.
O’Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609,
615 (1998) (describing origins of the Internet); Douglas C. Heumann, United States v.
Thomas: Will the Community Standard Be Roadkill on the Information Superhighway?, 23
WIS. L. REV. 189 (1995).
77

David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 231, 481 n.10 (1996).
78
See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (stating that due to its
nature the Internet size is almost impossible to be determined at a given moment).
79

ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (defining the Internet as a
“decentralized, self-maintaining series of redundant links among computers and computer
networks, capable of rapidly transmitting communications without direct human involvement
or control”).
80

See Scott. A. Shail, Note, Reno v. ACLU: The First Congressional Attempt to Regulate
Pornography on the Internet Fails First Amendment Scrutiny, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 273, 292
(1998) (reporting that the total number of computer users with Internet access was expected to
reach 200 million by the year 1999).
81

ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000)

82

See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 166 (noting that World Wide Web, a publishing forum,
should be distinguished from the Internet).
83
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999). “[S]exually explicit material
includes text, pictures, audio and video images, extends from the modesty titillating to the
hardest core.” Id. at 484.
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many ways a far more speech-enhancing medium than radio or television, print, the
mails or even the village green.”84 The type of information published on the web
includes “every facet of art, literature, music, news, and debate,” as well as sexually
explicit materials.85 As soon as the content of the web is made available for
viewing–“published”–anybody anywhere in the world may access it.86
A. Bulletin Boards Should be Distinguished from the World Wide Web
Bulletin Board Systems (hereinafter BBS), like the one involved in United States
v. Thomas,87 in which a prosecution of a California couple for interstate
transportation of obscene materials took place, are a variation of on-line services.
Bulletin boards are defined as systems consisting of modems and personal
computers, which allow its users to access other remote computers to transfer and
download files, and also to use such services as e-mail, chat lines, and public
messages.88 It should be noted that while the decision in United States v. Thomas
dealt specifically with electronic bulletin boards, some argue that this precedent
should be equally applicable to the internet and the world wide web.89
These different on-line services should not be treated equally. One of the
important differences between world wide web and a BBS is that to become a
member of most BBS one has to be approved for membership to such web sites and,
therefore, access is limited.90 Thus, when a host of a website approves a potential
member from a different jurisdiction, he or she explicitly approves transmissions of
sexually explicit material into locations where users reside. In this case, there should
be no surprise for the website host if obscenity charges are brought against him and
the community standards applied in a prosecution are of those locales where users
receive the allegedly obscene materials. In this respect, a BBS is a service with a
great deal of interaction between users and administration of the website. And
accordingly in this type of situation, distribution of obscene materials can be
prevented simply by denying membership and service to users from those
jurisdictions which community standards are patently more puritanical.91
84
Complaint in ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp 160, at 1*, at http://www.aclu.org/court/
nycdacomplaint.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2001).
85

See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 163.

86

Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 484 (stating that no obstacles exist to prevent the content from
entering any geographic location once it is published).
87

74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).

88

Id. at 705.

89

Battersby, supra note 32, at § 8.03[A], 8-42.

90
Even the opinion in Thomas points out the important feature of BBS in that its operators
by employing certain screening procedures could deny user access in jurisdictions where the
risk of finding of obscenity was greater than that in California. See 74 F.3d at 711.
91
In fact, many large-scale commercial distributors located in more liberal jurisdictions
being aware of the fact that they may be prosecuted for distribution of obscenity into
conservative jurisdictions have chosen against distributing into jurisdictions where likelihood
of prosecution is high. See Mike Godwin, Community Standards and BBSs, at
http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/obscen_virtcom_stds_godwin.article (last visited Nov. 10,
2000).
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The nature of world wide web differs significantly from BBS in this respect. The
operators of regular websites cannot preclude the risk of liability even if they wished
not to subject themselves to liability in communities with less tolerant obscenity
standards. The nature of web sites is passive because there is little or no interaction
between hosts of those sites and users. Moreover, a host, once he publishes materials
on the site, cannot restrict access to and downloading of those materials onto
computers of users who reside in communities in which such matters are considered
obscene.92 In fact, anybody anywhere in the world if equipped with a computer and
internet access can download to his computer whatever material is posted on the site.
Many issues, such as jurisdictional ones, that followed the introduction of a new
medium are not new, but with respect to attempts to bridle them, a strong temptation
exists to treat them within old concepts that are inappropriate for the new context.
Unsuccessful state and federal legislative attempts to regulate the medium of the new
era examined below demonstrate the need for new approaches in solving problems
accompanying the internet.
B. Speech Regulation and the Internet
The internet may fairly be regarded as a never-ending worldwide
conversation. The government may not, through the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (hereinafter “CDA”), interrupt that conversation.93
1. Federal Attempts to Regulate the Internet
Ever since the electronic wonder of the internet came to life, Congress was
concerned with the issues of regulating the content of this medium. Easy availability
of pornographic and obscene materials on the internet provoked the first attempt by
the government to regulate the content of online communications in the CDA.94
Congress decided to treat the internet as a broadcast medium and susceptible to strict
governmental regulation in contrast to print media.95 Thus, the CDA was placed
under the jurisdiction of the FCC, which is responsible for enforcement of the
broadcast medium’s regulations such as television, radio, and cable.96 The CDA
included provisions dealing with three main felonious prohibitions.
The first prohibition related to telecommunications devices that were used
knowingly in the transmission of any obscene or indecent material with an intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any other person or with knowledge that the
recipient of the communication is under eighteen years of age.97 Section 223(d)(1) of
the CDA prohibited use of an “interactive computer service” to “display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age” a communication that, “in context,
92

“Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other Internet users
worldwide.” ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
93

Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883 (Dalzell, J., concurring).

94

47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(B), (a)(2)(d) (2000).

95

See Battersby, supra note 32, at § 8.02[C], 27.

96

See id.

97

47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” Finally, section
223(a)(1)(A)(ii) made it a crime to use a telecommunications device to send an
indecent communication “with intention to annoy” to any person, regardless of age.
Almost immediately after enactment of the CDA, lawsuits were filed to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute.
In ACLU v. Reno,98 plaintiffs filed suit seeking enjoinment of the enforcement of
two of the above mentioned provisions.99 The purpose of the provisions was to
prevent minors from gaining access not only to obscene materials, but also to
“indecent” and “patently offensive” materials communicated over the internet.100
The opponents of the CDA argued that the statute restricting internet content
infringed upon adults’ right to free speech. On February 15, 1996, the CDA was
enjoined to the extent it purported to prohibit “indecent” material, regulation of
which was not within the government’s power.101
The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court
affirmed the holding finding the challenged provisions unconstitutional.102 The
Court reasoned that the content-based restrictions on transmission of speech were
ambiguous, chilled protected speech, and were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
the goals of protecting children from indecent materials.103 More specifically, the
Court held that the CDA failed to satisfy the three-prong test designed in Miller, in
that the banned material was not “specifically defined by the applicable law.”104 The
Court also determined that the internet should not be regulated in a manner similar to
broadcast media, such as television and radio, and should not be subject to the same
relaxed First Amendment scrutiny as the broadcast medium, but rather should be
entitled to full First Amendment protection.105 Because the CDA purported to
regulate the content of speech, the government had a high burden of proving that the
statute complied with the constitutional requirements and thus, in striking down the
federal law, the Court emphasized that “in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”106

98

929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

99

The challenged provisions included: 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) and (d) (2000).

100

47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(d) (2000).

101

See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824 (providing a comprehensive opinion as to the reasons for
granting preliminary injunction).
102

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

103

Id. at 879.

104

See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.

105

Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-69.

106

Id. at 885.
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In ApolloMedia Corp.107 v. Reno,108 the constitutionality of another section of the
CDA was brought into question, i.e., § 223(a)(1)(A)(ii). This provision criminalized
the use of a telecommunications device to send an obscene or indecent
communication with “intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person.”
The court in ApolloMedia upheld the challenged portion of the CDA, holding that
the language of the statute was intended to regulate only obscenity, and not indecent
language.109
The second and most recent Congressional attempt to regulate the content of the
internet in the name of “the children,” was the Child Online Protection Act of 1998
(hereinafter “COPA”).110 After the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the
CDA that sought to regulate the dissemination of indecent materials over the
internet, its successor, referred to by some as “the son of the CDA”,111 represents the
attempt of Congress to get around the constitutional defects of the CDA. The
governmental intervention through the enactment of the COPA was premised on
findings that the “harmful material” posted on the world wide web was easily
accessible by children while the current technology proved to be ineffective in
restricting such access.112 Section 231 of Title 47 provided in pertinent part that
“[w]hoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in
interstate or foreign communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful113 to minors shall be fined not
more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.”114 Before liability
can attach under the COPA, material published on the web must be found “harmful
to minors” by applying a three-part test, which mirrors that in Miller.115
The COPA also provided a “safe harbor”—three affirmative defenses for web
sites operators who in good faith, restricted access by minors to material that is
harmful to minors. Defendants could avoid conviction for violating the COPA if
they (a) required “use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number;”116 or (b) accepted a digital certificate that verifies

107
Plaintiff, a corporation maintaining a web site entitled “annoy.com,” allowed its users to
send e-mail messages that might be considered indecent by some communities to various
government public officials and public figures.
108

19 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998).

109

Id. at 1096.

110

47 U.S.C. § 231 et seq. Sponsored by Rep. Mike Oxley, R-Ohio, and Sen. Dan Coats,
R-Ind. and approved by the 105th Congress, COPA was signed into law by President Clinton
on October, 23, 1998.
111

Henry Cohen, When Smut Hurts, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000, at 70.

112

ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).

113

For definition of “harmful to minors” as outlined in COPA, see supra note 3.

114

47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000).

115

47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000).

116

47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A) (2000).
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age;117 or (c) restricted access by minors to harmful material “by any other
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.”118
2. Challenge to COPA
The COPA was challenged immediately by the American Civil Liberties Union
on behalf of seventeen groups and individuals in ACLU v. Reno.119 The
constitutional challenges raised by ACLU were as follows: (1) the COPA was
facially invalid under the First Amendment as a burden to speech that is
constitutionally protected for adults, (2) it was facially invalid because it violated the
First Amendment rights of minors, and, (3) it was unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.120 In February 1999, enforcement of
the provisions of the COPA was enjoined by the federal district court in
Philadelphia. In April 1999, the Justice Department appealed to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit upheld the district court finding that COPA
“impos[ed] a burden on speech that is protected for adults” and, therefore, was
unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment.121 In affirming the grant of
preliminary injunction, the appellate court based its opinion primarily on the basis of
the likely unconstitutionality of the clause defining “harmful to minors” applying
“contemporary community standards.”122 The overbreadth of this provision which
was “virtually ignored by the parties and the amicus in their respective briefs but
raised by us at oral argument” was of such concern to the court that it was led to
conclude as to the likelihood of the COPA’s unconstitutionality, in its entirety
without reference to its other provisions.123
Although enforcement of the statute was enjoined, the work of the Commission
on Online Child Protection (hereinafter “Commission”), which Congress established
along with the COPA in October 1998, continued. The Commission was composed
of nineteen members representing internet access services; providers of internet
filtering, blocking services or software; academic experts; content providers, and
government.124 This entity was directed to conduct a study in order to identify
117

47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B) (2000).

118

47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(C) (2000).

119

31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d 217 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (The plaintiffs, a
group of web site operators and publishers, included ACLU (on behalf of all its members
including Nadine Strossen, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Patricia Nell Warren, Mitchell Tepper and
David Bunnell); Androgyny Books, Inc. d/b/a A Different Light Bookstores; American
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (on behalf of all its members); Artnet Worldwide
Corporation; Blackstripe; Addazi Inc. d/b/a Condomania; Electronic Frontier Foundation;
Electronic Privacy Information Center; Free Speech Media; Internet Content Coalition;
OBGYN.NET; Philadelphia Gay News; Powell’s Bookstore; RIOTGRRL; Salon Internet,
Inc.; West Stock, Inc. and PlanetOut Corporation).
120

Id. at 477.

121

Reno, 217 F.3d at 162.

122

Id. at 166.

123

Id. at 174.

124

COPA COMMISSION, INFORMATION AND RESOURCES ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON ONLINE
CHILD PROTECTION (COPA), at http://www.copacommission.org/commission/orginal.shtml
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technological and other methods for reducing access by minors to material that is
harmful to minors on the internet. In doing so, the Commission was supposed to
assess potential solutions in light of the technical realities of the internet and legal
concerns raised by the First Amendment, privacy and law enforcement interests.
The Commission’s mandate expired, and on October 20, 2000, the Commission
submitted a detailed report to Congress setting forth its recommendations on how
these problems should be handled.125
3. State Internet Laws
State legislatures have not been idle as far as the regulation of the internet content
is concerned, and many censorship laws have been enacted while others are in the
making. Many of the newly passed bills have been challenged on different
constitutional grounds. In American Library Association v. Pataki,126 the New York
Decency Law127 was invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds.128 Here, New York
law made it a crime to transmit material “harmful to minors” via computer to anyone
aged seventeen or younger.129 The court held that the law unconstitutionally
regulated conduct outside the state’s borders, created an impermissible intrusion into
interstate commerce, and subjected use of the internet to inconsistent regulation.130
(last visited Sept. 25, 2001). Among the members of the Commission were representatives of
Network Solutions Inc., Internet Content Rating Association, Security Software Systems,
Center for Democracy & Technology, Rocky Mountain College, National Law Center for
Children and Families, Education Networks of America, Department of Justice,
Crosswalk.com, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Commerce/NTIA, San Jose State
University, PSINet Inc., Walt Disney Internet Group, Yahoo! Inc., Nortel Networks, America
Online, Inc. and author of Kids Online/Founder, Protectkids.com. COPA COMMISSION,
INFORMATION AND RESOURCES ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION ACT
(COPA), at http://www.copacomm ission.org/report/commissioners.shtml (last visited Sept.
25, 2001).
125
See COMMISSION ON ONLINE CHILD PROTECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000),
available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2001) [hereinafter
COMMISSION].
126

969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

127

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (1997).

128

969 F. Supp. at 167.

129

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (1997).

130

Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173-80. With respect to the inconsistent effect of the law on the
Internet, the court stated that
[A]n internet user cannot foreclose access to her work from certain states or send
differing versions of her communications to different jurisdictions. In this sense, the
Internet user is in a worse position than the truck driver or train engineer who can steer
around Illinois or Arizona, or change the mudguard or train configuration at the state
line; the Internet user has no ability to bypass any particular state. The user must thus
comply with the regulation imposed by the state with the most stringent standard or
forego Internet communication of the message that might or might not subject her to
prosecution. . . . Haphazard and uncoordinated state regulation can only frustrate the
growth of cyberspace.
Id. at 183.
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In ACLU v. Johnson,131 the court affirmed issuance of preliminary injunction
preventing enforcement of a New Mexico statute,132 which made it a crime to
disseminate material “harmful to a minor” by computer.133 The statute was declared
unconstitutional since the law would impermissibly regulate conduct outside New
Mexico and thus violate the Commerce Clause,134 and would burden protected adult
communication on the internet in violation of the First Amendment right to such
speech.135
In a more recent decision, Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,136 the
court of appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting
the preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of a Michigan statute,137 which
purported to prohibit the use of computers or the internet to disseminate “sexually
explicit matter” to minors.138
V. SHOULD THERE BE A NEW STANDARD OR NO STANDARD AT ALL?
As discussed earlier, the concept of community standards was established in
Miller as part of the test for obscenity after the Supreme Court’s struggling efforts in
1950’s and 1960’s to determine whether “obscene” speech could be either
meaningfully defined or punished criminally.139 This prong of the Miller test is
probably the most problematic with respect to its applicability to the internet.140 This
131

194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).

132

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie Supp. 1998).

133

Id.

134

Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1160-61.

135

Id. at 1155 (In agreeing with the holding of the district court, the appeals court stated
that the statute violated the First Amendment “‘because it effectively bans speech that is
constitutionally protected for adults;’” … “it was not ‘the least restrictive means of serving its
stated interest;’” and it does not directly and materially advance a compelling governmental
interest.).
136

238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000).

137

1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 33, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.671 (2001) et seq.

138

In reaching its decision, the district court stated that the statute limiting the receipt and
communication of information through the Internet based on the content of that information
was unconstitutional in that it “offend[ed] the guarantee of free speech in the First
Amendment. . . .” 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E. D. Mich. 1999).
139

See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
140

The criticism of the test as a whole was expressed even by several members of the
Court. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1987) (Scalia, J.) (voicing need for
“reexamination of Miller,” since determination of whether material has literary or artistic
value is matter of taste and “De gustibus non est disputandum”); id. at 516 n.11 (Stevens, J.)
(criminal prosecution for obscenity involving consenting adults should not be permitted); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544, 573 (1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, with Blackmun, Stevens and
Souter, JJ.) (“obscenity separated from protected expression only by a ‘dim and uncertain
line’”); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“line
between communications which ‘offend’ and those which do not is too blurred to identify
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concept connotes the standards of a community varying in size, but in no event, the
size of such community reaching the dimensions of the nation. The Court in Miller
entertained the idea of applying the nationwide standards but promptly rejected it as
unrealistic and vague.
A. Community Standards Versus Other Standards
1. National Standard
When attempting to formulate a national standard for obscenity, one can
probably pursue several approaches. One way to define the nationwide standard
would be by adopting, as the standard, the views of the community recognized as the
most liberal and most acceptable to obscenity in the country. The other would be to
adopt the look at obscenity through the eyes of the people residing in the locale who
have the least tolerance to the obscenity.141 It is evident that whatever approach is
chosen, the end result will be that somebody’s tastes and attitudes will be trumped by
differences of another group of people. This result is inevitable, even if one tries to
work out a standard in between these extreme points of view on obscenity.
Recognizing that conducting obscenity prosecutions on the basis of a national
“community standard” would be an exercise in futility, the Court in Miller stated that
“[o]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect
that such standards [of what is patently offensive] could be articulated for all 50
states in a single formulation.”142 In Court’s opinion “[i]t [was] neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of
Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City.”143 Thus, in denouncing the national standard, the Court
was trying to prevent states with very liberal views from dictating their standards on
more conservative states.
Although the Supreme Court in Miller deemed it wrong and inadmissible for
New York or Las Vegas to dictate their opinion on what is considered obscene to the
conservative communities, the federal courts, as the decision in United States v.
Thomas144 illustrates, consider it quite all right for a conservative community like
Memphis, Tennessee to set standards for Milpitas, California. Such an approach,
however, should be equally inappropriate. In this respect, it is laudable that the
criminal conduct”); accord, Board of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 576
(1987) (O’Connor, J.: line too “murky”). One of problems specific to the “community
standards” prong of the Miller test is that a defendant is deprived of due process, since no
notice of community standards is given until a jury identifies the relevant community and the
content of such community standards. See Cohen, supra note 111.
141
Under this interpretation the national standard would “have the effect of prohibiting the
distribution of material in a more permissive community.” See SCHAUER, supra note 23, at
119.
In fact, the nature of the Internet transforms the “local community standard” into a
“national community standard” by pressuring Internet content providers to tailor speech to the
least tolerant community.
142

413 U.S. at 30.

143

Id. at 32.

144

74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Appellate Court for the Third Circuit found it likely unconstitutional to use
“community standards” to judge speech communicated by means of a nongeographic medium like the internet.145 “Because of the peculiar geography-free
nature of cyberspace,” the appeals court wrote, “a ’community standards’ test would
essentially require every Web communication to abide by the most restrictive
community’s standards.”146 The non-geographic nature of the internet allows online
communications to circulate throughout the world while the speaker, as a rule, has no
information as to who the audience is and which communities the readers are
from.147 Due to the fact that the web is not geographically constrained, applying the
geographically oriented “community standards” simply does not work with the
internet.
An important point made by the court in ACLU v. Reno is that the internet is
entitled to special considerations, because “each medium of expression must be
assessed for the First Amendment purposes by the standards best suited to it, for each
may present its own problems.”148 One of the main differences between the
technology-laden medium of the internet and more conventional media such as
books or videos is that a seller of adult books ordinarily makes a conscious and
voluntary decision to distribute his product into a particular jurisdiction in which he
might be subsequently prosecuted. In this event, criminal intent is clearly
established for the purpose of prosecution for distributing obscenity. On the other
hand, distribution from a website may occur without a website operator being aware
of it. Moreover, once material is published, website operators are totally without any
means to limit access to their sites and prevent viewers of a given geographic
community from receiving sexually explicit material in their jurisdiction.149 In the
opinion of the Third Circuit, these crucial differences between a “brick and mortar
outlet” and the online web dictate that a different approach is taken in applying a
First Amendment analysis to the new medium.150
2. Virtual Community Standards
In light of the fact that revolutional advancement in communications media
changes the conventional meaning of “community,” a question arises as to whether it
still makes sense to define the “community standards” in a localized geographic
context. One such alternative of defining “community standards” in terms of a nongeographic community was proposed by defendants in Thomas—a virtual
145

ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000).

146

Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78.

147

See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“An individual sending a
message that will be retransmitted by a mail exploder program has no way of knowing the email addresses of other subscribers”); “[O]ne who posts an article to a news group has no way
of knowing who will choose to retrieve it.” Id. at 928.
148

217 F. 3d 162, 174 (3rd Cir. 2000).

149

American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[A]n Internet
user cannot foreclose access to . . . work from certain states or send differing versions of . . .
communication(s) to different jurisdictions . . . . The Internet user has no ability to bypass any
particular state”).
150

Reno, 217 F.3d at 175.
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community “that is based on the broad-ranging connections among people in
cyberspace.”151 The court in Thomas avoided consideration of whether a virtual
community standard could be determined. The court found it unnecessary to adopt a
new definition of “community” for use in obscenity prosecutions involving bulletin
boards because the defendants in Thomas knowingly sent the pictures to a specific
recipient in Tennessee who was approved for membership of the board before
placing a request that the pictures be sent to Tennessee.152
Arguments made in favor of accepting online “community standards” for
purposes of judging obscenity include a suggestion that the same reasoning applied
by the Court in Miller should be applied to the online world. In Miller, the Court,
recognizing that different communities have different moral standards, held that likeminded people living in those communities should be able to choose the rules by
which to abide.153 An argument has been made that, by the same token, those who
spend part of their lives online ought to be afforded an opportunity to live in a
community where they feel comfortable. Therefore, for purposes of determining
whether a certain work distributed online is obscene, the standards of the virtual
community should be taken as a guideline.154 At the same time, the proponent of
these virtual standards raises a concern that, assuming the virtual community is
recognized for purposes of obscenity test, the courts will have to establish who
comprises this online community.155
Among possible solutions as to how the online community should be defined one
commentator suggests several alternatives: that it should encompass the whole
world, only active users of the internet at a given moment, or that there should be not
one but numerous communities comprised of people who communicate with each
other.156 Others elaborate that applying virtual community standards would entail
instructing the jury as to the nature of the internet, extent of sexually explicit material
on the internet, availability of blocking and filtering devices as well as other
information reasonably representing the virtual culture.157
The endeavor to define virtual internet community and identify its populace is
likely to prove to be a difficult if not impossible one, because the nature of this
“community” changes and evolves so rapidly. The problem that most proponents of

151

74 F.3d at 711.

152

Id. at 712.

153

413 U.S. at 32.

154
LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 250-51 (1995). See also
Egan, supra note 49 (technological aspects of the Internet compel a virtual community
standard; Cyberspace users should have an opportunity to control the kind of information that
is available in their online communities).
155

ROSE, supra note 154, at 251. The author raises an unanswered question whether the
Internet community should be thought of as comprised of the entire population of the
cyberworld or only users of adult online services. Id.
156
Kimberly A. Gobla, The Infeasibility of Federal Internet Regulation: The Online
Parental Control Act of 1996 – A Reaction to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 102
DICK. L. REV. 93, 108 (1997).
157

See Egan, supra note 49, at 147.
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the virtual community standards do not mention is that it would be equally
impossible to establish certain guidelines for determining obscenity considering the
dimensions of the Cyberspace. “[T]he ‘community’ for the Internet is literally the
world.”158 And, because the jury plays an important role in determining prurient
interest and patent offensiveness parts of the obscenity test, some of the problems
courts will have to face if the virtual community standards come up for consideration
again will be related to jury impaneling. As one commentator put it, defining an
appropriate jury pool and assembling potential jurors for trial will be beyond the
courts’ strength for reason that not too many people living in Florida would accept
jury duty in Alaska.159
3. Is Obscenity Even a Problem?
Denying First Amendment protection to obscenity, the Court in Roth v. United
States justified its decision as furthering “the social interest in order and morality.”160
This exception to the First Amendment, therefore allows the majority to censor
speech on the basis of its taste.161 But should the majority’s ability to dictate what
kind of speech it likes or dislikes reach as far as the domain of the internet? It may be
conceded that obscenity can hurt individuals when it is integrated into the
community by means of bookstores, movie theaters or newsstands. As one
commentator observes, in contrast, the potentially obscene material published on the
web is out of the public view and thus, presents little “danger of offending the
sensibilities of unwilling recipients.”162 The impact on the community is minimal
because the material that is made available for viewing only to those members of the
community who voluntarily choose to do so. In this regard, if these viewers find the
work offensive, they obviously want to be offended.163
Even if the government continues its efforts to develop a test applicable in
prosecutions of dissemination of obscene materials on the web, Congressional
158

See Gobla, supra note 156, at 108.

159

Dominic F. Maisano, Obscenity Law and the Internet: Determining the Appropriate
Community Standard after Reno v. ACLU, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 555, 577 (1998). Another
problem with the virtual community standard is difficulty to instruct jurors as to what “virtual
community” considers obscene. Although according to the Court in Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115, 121 (1973), “the defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony”
on the issue of community standards, in the light of the enormous size of the virtual
community and vast variety of opinions, it is difficult to imagine that some common
denominator of views on obscenity can be outlined.
160

354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).

161

See generally Cohen, supra note 111 (stating that determination of whether a particular
work is obscene is a question of taste).
162

See Eric Handelman, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Obscenity Standard
Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709, 730
(1995) (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19 (1973) (recognizing that the States have a
legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles)).
163

John T. Mitchell, An Exclusionary Rule for Protecting Obscenity, 10 J.L. POL. 183, 195
(1994).
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attempts to prohibit obscenity on the internet will not achieve the desired goal unless
the worldwide effort is taken to regulate internet communications. It is undisputed
that a significant portion of sexually explicit material originates abroad164 and thus,
even assuming that domestic legislation is successful in eradicating distribution of
obscenity via the internet within the United States, sexually explicit materials will
still be made available for viewing to Americans by the foreign websites. The cycles
of legislation and litigation that involve federal attempts to regulate the content on
the internet indicate that future federal legislation on the subject, if any, is likely to
be unsuccessful in passing constitutional muster. Using the language of United
States District Judge Stewart, it should be kept in mind that “Congress may not
regulate indecency on the Internet at all . . . . Just as the strength of the Internet is
chaos, so the strength of our liberty depends upon the chaos and cacophony of the
unfettered speech the First Amendment protects.”165
4. Children and Sexually Explicit Content of the Web
Aside from preserving “order and morality,” protection of children from
pornography which is so abundant in the Cyberworld is another interest that drives
state and federal legislatures to enact laws regulating internet content. While “the
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is
harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards,” according to the Second
Circuit, the government “may not regulate at all if it turns out that even the least
restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations on freedom
of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those limitations.”166
Enjoining enforcement of the COPA, United States District Judge Lowell Reed, Jr.
mentioned that “blocking or filtering technology may be at least as successful as
COPA would be in restricting minors’ access to harmful material online without
imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech. . . .”167 In light of
governmental ineptitude to formulate constitutionally sound and workable
regulations of the internet content, self-regulation by virtue of filtering and blocking
unwanted material on the internet may be the only way to achieve the goal of
protecting children from harmful material as well as preserving “order and morality”
of the society at large.
5. Self-Regulation of Internet Content is a Constitutional Way to
Achieve Legitimate Governmental Purposes
In the wake of two failed Congressional attempts to regulate online content
through the CDA and the COPA, the approach of self-regulation was strongly
suggested among other recommendations presented by the Commission in its 49-

164

See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“as much as thirty percent of
the sexually explicit material currently available on the Internet originates in foreign
countries”).
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Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 877, 883, aff’d, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal
quotations omitted).
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ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff’d, 217 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir.

2000).
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page report to Congress.168 More specifically, with respect to self-regulation the
COPA Commission recommends that Internet Service Providers (hereinafter “ISP”s)
should voluntarily undertake “best practices” to protect minors.169 In the language of
the Commission “best practices” that the ISPs are encouraged to pursue mean
“voluntarily providing, offering, or enabling user empowerment technologies to
assist end-users to protect children from materials that is harmful to minors.”170 In
promoting “best practices,” ISPs are also encouraged to apprise consumers of the
right of ISPs to take bona fide action to restrict availability of material that violates
such practices.171 Timely removal of child pornography by ISPs when made aware
of its presence on their servers is also recommended by the Commission as part of
“best practices.”172
There are numerous ways in which self-regulation of the internet content is
already being implemented today.173 Net Nanny, 174 Cyber Patrol,175 SurfWatch,176
and others provide consumers with software for blocking offensive content on the
ISPs’ systems. This type of filtering/blocking, referred to as client-side filtering, is
achieved by using Universal Resource Locator (hereinafter “URL”) lists.177 Each
blocking software maker compiles its own encrypted list of blocked websites which
may or may not be disclosed.178 A list of sites, the content of which is blocked by a
particular piece of software, can be made on the basis of automated processes, user
168

COPA Commission’s recommendations were grouped in five categories:
(1) educating the public by the government as well as by the private sector about
technologies and methods available to protect children online;
(2) empowering consumers with protecting technologies to make choices of online
content for their children;
(3) enforcing existing federal and state laws against obscenity and child
pornography as well as addressing international aspects of Internet crime;
(4) encouraging Internet Service Provider industry to self-regulate by voluntarily
undertaking “best practices” to protect minors;
(5) encouraging adult industry to self-regulate in order to restrict minors’ ready
access to commercial online adult content. See COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 3946.
169

Id. at 44-45.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 45.

172

Id.

173

For a detailed overview of filtering/blocking tools and their effectiveness see
COMMISSION, supra note 125, at 19-22.
174

For information on this filtering software see http://www.netnanny.com (last visited
Dec. 15, 2000).
175
For information on this filtering software see http://www.cyberpatrol.com (last visited
Dec. 15, 2000).
176

For information on this filtering software see http://www.surfwatch.com (last visited
Dec. 15, 2000).
177

“URL” refers to the address of an Internet site.
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See COMMISSION, supra note 125, at 19.
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options and human review.179 The COPA Commission’s rating of the effectiveness
of server-side filtering was 7.4 on a scale of zero to ten.180 This was the highest
rating regarding the relative effectiveness of different technologies and methods
available today and examined by the Commission.181 The Commission also
determined that while the server-side filtering raised First Amendment concerns
because of its potential to be over-inclusive in blocking content, such impact is
insignificant as long as the consumers are apprised of the criteria for filtering and
filters are made customizable and flexible.182
Because filtering and blocking software achieves somewhat effective results in
censoring the internet content, the same technological tools that are being developed
and used to prevent children from exposure to sexually explicit material on the web
can be made available to adults who find such materials offensive and do not want to
exercise their right to freedom of speech online to the full extent.183 Undertaking of
the “best practices” advocated by the COPA Commission can be extended to apply
not only to protection of children from material harmful to them, but also to
protection of adults who find sexually explicit material offensive. This could be
achieved by having the ISPs develop tools for access to the internet with different
levels of censorship. As a result, consumers will have an ability to browse the web
content to the extent it was filtered by the web browser of their choice.184 Consumers
who do not find sexually explicit material offensive or obscene and those not
concerned with the possibility that their children might be exposed to harmful
materials, while exploring the online world, would be able to subscribe to services
provided by ISPs with the content of the internet not subjected to any kind of
blocking or filtering whatsoever.

179

Id.

180

Id.

181

Besides server-side filtering, the following methods and technologies used for reducing
access by children to harmful to minors materials were evaluated: online information
resources that collect information regarding the technologies and methods that can protect
children; family education programs; client-side filtering; filtering using text-based content
analysis; labeling and rating systems; age verification systems; new top-level domain/zoning;
increased prosecution and others. Ratings were made regarding the relative effectiveness,
accessibility, user cost, cost imposed on sources of lawful harmful to minors materials, and
adverse impacts on privacy, First Amendment values, and law enforcement. Id.
182

Id. at 19-20.
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Attempts to block unwanted content are being compromised by counter efforts to
develop computer programs that disable blocking software. A group of free speech advocates
called Peacefire: Open Access for the Net Generation released a new program that according
to their claim can easily disable all popular Windows censorware (SurfWatch, Cyber Patrol,
Net Nanny, CYBERsitter, X-Stop, PureSight and Cyber Snoop). The release of the software
is done in response to the passage of a Congressional bill requiring the use of blocking
software in libraries and schools funded by the federal government.
184

Corporations such as Microsoft, America OnLine, Netscape or Internet search engines
like Yahoo, Infoseek, Alta Vista, Hot Bot and others could develop and market several
variations of the Internet browsing products each being tailored to the needs and concerns of a
particular group of consumers.
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On the other hand, consumers with heightened concerns for the online safety of
their children and those consumers who do not seek sexually explicit content, by
choosing a web browser equipped with filtering and blocking software, would be
able to extract from the internet only the content rid of unwanted speech. Thus, by
allowing consumers to make an informed decision in tailoring their preferences with
respect to the speech published online, the problem of affecting unwilling recipients
would be eliminated. Also, the First Amendment right to free speech would not be
seriously affected by potential over-inclusivity in blocking content if consumers
voluntarily choose the software with particular filtering criteria and are aware of the
fact that certain speech, though not the type they are trying to avoid, will be made
unavailable to them due to present technological shortcomings of the software.
VI. CONCLUSION
The obscenity law has not changed since the decision in Miller v. California.
The invention of the internet and its non-geographic nature practically rendered the
Miller test unconstitutional when applied to this new medium. The concept of
contemporary community standards of the current obscenity test is out of pace with
the advancement of new technologies. To avoid the chilling effect on freedom of
expression by subjecting materials published on the internet to vague and subjective
community standards the content of the internet communications should be left to
self-regulation. Freedom of individual consumers as to the type of internet content
they choose to view should not be curtailed. Necessity to come up with new
approaches of solving problems related to freedom of speech in the era of the
internet is dictated by this unconventional medium. The time is ripe to reconsider
the fundamentals of the First Amendment’s guarantee in order to keep freedom of
speech in the default setting.
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